In which we see Alexander Hamilton in a frenzy of valor, and Dianne indulging in a historiographical rant.
Most prominent American leaders during the Revolutionary War period wrote well, often brilliantly – but the transcript of the testimony at General Charles Lee’s court-martial is as close as we’ll ever get to hearing some of them speak. Although Lee’s court-martial doesn’t figure in Hamilton: An American Musical, it shows a facet of Hamilton that made me rethink an earlier post. Excerpts from the testimony are below; the full transcript is here.
Lee’s court-martial stretched from July 4 to August 9, 1778, shifting along with the army from New Brunswick to Morgantown to Paramus, Peeksill, and North Castle. Presiding was Major-General Lord Stirling, whom we last met leading the Maryland 400 at the Battle of Brooklyn. Nearly 40 witnesses were called, including members of Washington’s staff (Alexander Hamilton, John Laurens, and others), members of Lee’s staff, and officers who had commanded various parts of the battlefield.
A question for military historians: was it normal to have eight generals or brigadier-generals at the same battle, in an army of 11,000? And those were only the ones called to testify at Lee’s trial. There may have been more.
The Battle of Monmouth: overview
Here’s the CliffsNotes version of the Battle of Monmouth. (Eyewitness accounts of bits and pieces of it are in last week’s blog post.) In June 1778, 11,000 or so British soldiers plus hundreds of Tories and a 12-mile baggage train set out overland from Philadelphia to New York. At Washington’s council of war, Lee (who was second-ranking general in the army) and others argued against a direct attack on the British. After much debate, Major-General Lafayette was sent with a force of 4,000 to delay the British by harassing their rearguard. Lee then decided that honor required he hold command of that advance guard. He was sent forward with another thousand men and given command of the whole advance guard. When they met the British on June 28, Lee’s men retreated in some disorder. Washington, arriving with the main body of the Continental Army, saw the retreating soldiers and, meeting Lee, demanded to know why he was falling back. Lee claimed that his intelligence about the enemy’s strength was mistaken and that his subordinates had disobeyed orders; he also pointed out that he had advised against an attack. Washington rallied the troops and gave Lee command of a much smaller force.
The Americans fought the British to a stalemate. Overnight, the British slipped away. In British military history, the Battle of Monmouth was a mere skirmish. For the Americans, who had been drilled by Baron von Steuben all winter at Valley Forge, it was one of the earliest proofs that they could successfully confront the mighty British army. John Laurens wrote to his father that “the Standards of Liberty were planted in Triumph on the field of battle.”
Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the battle, Lee sent a series of venomous letters to Washington. On June 30, Lee was arrested. He was charged with disobeying orders in not attacking the enemy; allowing his troops to retreat in an unnecessary and sometimes disorderly manner; and being disrespectful to the commander-in-chief.
Hamilton’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial
Hamilton’s testimony appears in the printed transcript of the Lee court-martial on pp. 11-12, 13-14, and 66-72. It’s long and interesting, but understanding most of it would require more than the CliffsNotes version of the battle; so I’m only going to give you the bits that Lee responds to later.
Q. Did you fall in with General Lee’s troops afterwards [i.e., after Lee met Washington]?
A. I came up with them in their retreat a little time before the stand was made, by which the enemy received their first check. I heard General Washington say to General Lee, that it would be necessary for him (General Washington) to leave the ground and form the main body of the army, while I understood he recommended to General Lee to remain there, and take measures for checking the advance of the enemy; General Lee replied, he should obey his orders, and would not be the first man to leave the field. I was some little time after this, near General Lee, during which, however, I heard no measures directed, nor saw any taken by him to answer the purpose before-mentioned. (p. 68)
Pages 69-70:
Q, Were the troops, when you fell in with them the second time, retreating in order or disorder, and in what particular manner?
A. The corps that I saw were in themselves in tolerable good order, but seemed to be marching without system or design, as chance should direct; in short, I saw nothing like a general plan or combined disposition for a retreat; in this, however, the hurry of the occasion made it very difficult to have a distinct conception.
Q.: Was there any body drawn up in their rear to cover their retreat that you saw?
A. I saw no such thing.
Q. Were the orders that you heard General Lee give that day, given distinct and clear?
A. I recollect to have heard General Lee give two orders; at both times he seemed to be under a hurry of mind.
Q. Did General Lee, to your knowledge, advise General Washington of his retreat?
A. He did not, to my knowledge.
Pages 71-72
General Lee’s question. – Did you not express in the field an idea diametrically reverse of my state of mind, from what you have before mentioned in your testimony?
A. I did not. I said something to you in the field expressive of an opinion, that there appeared in you no want of that degree of self-possession, which proceeds from a want of personal intrepidity. I had no idea in my present evidence of insinuating the most distant charge of this nature, but only to designate that there appeared a certain hurry of spirits, which may proceed from a temper not so calm and steady as is necessary to support a man in such critical circumstances.
Other testimony at Lee’s court-martial
Lt. Colonel Tilghman, a member of Washington’s staff, also testified about Washington’s meeting with Lee in the field (pp. 91-3):
General Washington desired Colonel Shreve to march his men over the morass, halt them on the hill, and refresh them. Major Howell was in the rear of the regiment; he expressed himself with great warmth at the troops coming off, and said he had never seen the like. At the head of the next column General Lee was himself, when General Washington rode up to him, with some degree of astonishment, and asked him what was the meaning of this? General Lee answered, as Dr. M’Henry has mentioned, Sir, sir. I took it that General Lee did not hear the question distinctly. Upon General Washington’s repeating the question, General Lee answered, that from a variety of contradictory intelligence, and that from his orders not being obeyed, matters were thrown into confusion, and that he did not choose to beard the British army with troops in such a situation. He said that besides, the thing was against his own opinion. General Washington answered, whatever his opinion might have been, he expected his orders would have been obeyed, and then rode on towards the rear of the retreating troops.
Dr. Griffiths testified that on the battlefield, Lee was telling all and sundry that there was no need to fight, given that the French alliance would win the war (pp. 94-95):
I recollect perfectly well overtaking General Lee the 28th of June, about one hour and a half after the action commenced, about half way between the Meeting-house and English-Town, as near as I can recollect, as he was retiring at the head of his column. I asked the General, when I first overtook him, what appearance or what face things wore? his answer was, as I expected. I heard the General repeat the same to a number of persons at English-Town, who had asked him the same question, in almost the same words. From what followed in conversation, I thought his expectation was, that the day would be disgraceful to the American arms ; and as sure as we did attack, we would be beat, and he went on to assign reasons for it; the superiority of the enemy in point of discipline, that they outflanked us in cavalry, and that they outmanoeuvered us, were urged by General Lee. General Lee asserted that his advice had ever been contrary to a general action, for the reasons I have already mentioned, and that it was impolitic or imprudent to risk anything, when we were sure of succeeding in the main point; that the connection with France would secure our independency, and the American arms wanted no addition to their reputation.
Lee’s closing speech at his court-martial
Lee began his closing speech by arguing that he was exercising his discretionary powers (pp. 199-200):
Before I enter into a narration of what was performed or was not performed on the 28th of June, by the body of troops under my command, it is necessary to make as clear as possible to the Court, the nature and spirit of the orders I received from his Excellency, at least to explain my idea of them; for it must appear, from the evidence of the different commentators on these orders, that they were by no means precise and positive, but in a great measure discretionary, at least I conceived them as such, and am inclined to think that the Court will consider them in the same light. The several councils of war, held both in Pennsylvania and on this side of the Delaware, on the subject of the operations to be pursued in the Jerseys, reprobated the idea of risking a general engagement, as a measure highly absurd in the present, or rather then, circumstances of America …
But, whatever may have been the good sense of these Councils, I shall readily allow that they ought to have little or no weight with an officer, if subsequent orders from the Commander-in-Chief, or even a hint communicated, had been of such a nature, as to give reason to think that the idea had been discarded, and that the General had adopted a plan repugnant to these Councils; but I had not the least reason to think that he had discarded this idea. No letter I received, no conversation I ever held with him, indicated an intention or wish to court a general engagement; if he had, 1 protest solemnly, that, whatever 1 might have thought of the wisdom of the plan, 1 should have turned my thoughts solely to the execution.
Lee had his feelings hurt by the way Washington accosted him on the field (p. 219-20):
When I arrived first in his [Washington’s] presence, conscious of having done nothing that could draw on the least censure, but rather flattering myself with his congratulation and applause, I confess I was disconcerted, astonished and confounded by the words and manner in which his Excellency accosted me ; it was so novel and unexpected from a man, whose discretion, humanity and decorum I had from the first of our acquaintance stood in admiration of, that I was for some time incapable of making any coherent answer to questions so abrupt and in a great measure to me unintelligible. The terms, I think, were these —” I desire to know, sir, what is the reason—whence arises this disorder and confusion ?” The manner in which he expressed them was much stronger and more severe than the expressions themselves. When I recovered myself sufficiently, I answered, that I saw or knew of no confusion but what naturally arose from disobedience of orders, contradictory intelligence, and the impertinence and presumption of individuals, who were vested with no authority, intruding themselves in matters above them and out of their sphere. That the retreat, in the first instance, was contrary to my intentions, contrary to my orders, and contrary to my wishes. I even particularized …
Hamilton’s death wish revisited (yet again)
I find it fascinating that the only witness whose testimony Lee attempted to disparage in his concluding remarks was Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton’s comment that Lee about Lee being in a “hurry of mind” seems to have struck a nerve: if you read the transcript, you’ll notice Lee asks witness after witness to testify that he was calm, cool, and collected. He seems, in fact, more concerned with how he appeared than with how he was doing.
Lee gives quite a lengthy description of his interaction with Hamilton on the battlefield, apparently aiming to make Hamilton look foolhardy and himself braver, by comparison. You may have to read the first section in red over twice (I did) before you realize what an exceptionally nasty backhanded compliment it is.
There is one part of Colonel Hamilton’s evidence I cannot help animadverting upon; it has hurt me because it is even an impeachment of my qualifications as an officer, and it has hurt me the more, as it comes from a man of esteemed sense, and whose valor I myself was a witness of, although it is not that sort of valor, unless by practice and philosophy he can correct, will ever be of any great use to the community. The Colonel is pleased to allow me personal intrepidity, but that there appeared in me that hurry of spirits which may proceed from a temper not so calm and steady as is necessary to support a man in such critical circumstances. Now, in answer to all this fine language, I shall only repeat, as nearly as possible, the conversation that passed between us. When General Washington asked me whether I would remain in front and retain the command, or he should take it, and I had answered that I undoubtedly would, and that he should see that I myself should be one of the last to leave the field, Colonel Hamilton flourishing his sword, immediately exclaimed : That’s right, my dear General, and I will stay, and we will all die here on this spot. I must observe, that this hill was by no means a position to risk anything further than the troops then halted on it, with which I intended to cover my corps in their passage over the bridge, and give the enemy a check, to gain time for General Washington to make a disposition of the army. As this was the principle on which the hill was defended, I could but be surprised at his expression, but observing him much flustered and in a sort of frenzy of valor, I calmly requested him to observe me well and to tell me if I did not appear tranquil and master of my faculties; his answer was, that he must own that I was entirely possessed of myself; well, then (said I), you must allow me to be a proper judge of what I ought to do. Sir (I added) if you will take pains to examine that hill in our front, you will perceive that it so eminently commands this we are on, that it would be unpardonable to risk anything more on it than what necessity will oblige us; as to myself, I am as ready to die as what you possibly can be, but I am responsible for something more than my own person, I am responsible to the General and to the continent for the troops I have been entrusted with. When I have taken proper measures to get the main body of them in a good position, I will die with you on this spot, if you please. If Colonel Hamilton’s sentiments were really opposite to what his precise words were, I cannot help thinking it somewhat extraordinary that he and Colonel Laurens should have seen with so very different optics from those of every other gentleman who had an opportunity of observing me that day. (pp. 229-31)
Here comes the rant. (Some of you are only here for the rant, right?)
What happened at the Battle of Monmouth is as real and definite as what happened to me yesterday on the subway. However, not every aspect of what happened at Monmouth on June 28, 1778 was recorded and preserved. As any policeman will tell you, the accounts of excited eyewitnesses can vary widely.
If enough evidence is found, we can discover the historical truth. But for me, the historical truth is almost a side issue: the point is the journey to it. Seeking out information and deciding what’s reliable. Integrating new information: does it agree with or contradict what I already know? If it contradicts, how do I resolve that? This is a skill that’s as valuable when I’m listening to a politician talk today as when I’m studying 18th-century battles. And then, once I’ve discovered the facts, there’s the question of how they should be judged in their own context, and in my time: a whole ‘nother matter, plunging into thickets of thorny ethical questions.
The point is: Real historians don’t spend their time memorizing dates and statistics. They seek out information, integrate, and keep seeking and integrating for, like, ever. If you’re not willing to do that, or if it makes you nervous that history isn’t rote memorization, then leave your historian’s hat on the desk and close the door quietly behind you.
All right, now that it’s just us: In my post on back in March (“I imagine death so much it feels more like a memory” – title later changed to “Hamilton’s Death Wish, revisited”), I said that I didn’t see compelling evidence that Hamilton longed for martyrdom. Lee’s description of him on the battlefield makes me willing to allow that Hamilton wouldn’t have objected to dying on the battlefield in glory. It makes sense, in fact, since Hamilton’s closest friends were military men, for whom courage in the face of death is a requirement, and glorious death in battle is, if not a goal, at least an honorable end.
Hamilton didn’t fall in love with Eliza and become part of the Schuyler family for another 18 months – February, 1780. In fact, in one of the letters he wrote to her (September 6, 1780), he said that “I was once determined to let my existence and American liberty end together. My Betsey has given me a motive to outlive my pride, I had almost said my honor….” (More in my post here.)
Whether thoughts of martyrdom and death are threads that run through the rest of his life – that I can’t decide until I’ve seen more supporting evidence from his later writings. And I’m fine with that, because I enjoy the journey to the truth.
The verdict at Lee’s court-martial
On August 9, 1778, the court returned its verdict:
The Court having considered the first charge against Major-General Lee, the evidence and his defence, are of opinion, that he is guilty of disobedience of orders, in not attacking the enemy on the 28th of June, agreeable to repeated instructions; being a breach of the latter part of article 5th, section 2d of the Articles of War.
The Court having considered the second charge against Major-General Lee, the evidence and his defence, are of opinion, he is guilty of misbehavior before the enemy on the 28th of June, by making unnecessary, and in some few instances, a disorderly retreat; being a breach of the 13th article of the 13th section of the Articles of War.
The Court having considered the third charge against Major-General Lee, are of opinion, that he is guilty of disrespect to the Commander-in-Chief in two letters dated the 1st of July and the 28th of June; being a breach of the 2d article, section 2d of the Articles of War.
The Court do sentence Major-General Lee to be suspended from any command in the armies of the United States of North America, for the term of twelve months. (pp. 238-9)
More
- Lee’s court martial (full text as PDF)
- Next week: the Lee-Laurens duel.
- The usual disclaimer: This is the twenty-fourth in a series of posts on Hamilton: An American Musical. Other posts are available via the tag cloud at lower right. The ongoing “index” to these posts is my Kindle book, Alexander Hamilton: A Brief Biography. Bottom line: these are unofficial musings, and you do not need them to enjoy the musical or the soundtrack.
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