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When Lee was released in early 1778, he resumed his position as second-ranking general in the Continental Army. (On Lee’s military career and capture by the British, see last week’s post.) In late June, as the British prepared to evacuate Philadelphia, Washington and his commanders discussed whether to attack them as they marched the hundred miles to New York. The council of war, wrote Hamilton some days later, “would have done honor to the most honourable society of midwives, and to them only” (see below).

Lafayette takes the lead

Lee and some others opposed an attack. But on June 26, Washington decided to send out a small force (4,000 men) to harass the rearguard of the 12-mile-long British column, giving the rest of the Continental Army time to reach reach the British forces. Major General Lafayette was given command of this advance force.

Side note: I had never thought about communication during battles in this era. Most of the army was on foot, and with tens of thousands of men in the field, that meant they were spread out over a considerable distance. No satellite phones, cell phones, radios, telegraph lines. Washington dictated messages to his staff (his aides-de-camp: Hamilton, Laurens, and others) and sent one of them off on horseback to carry the message to the officer in charge in a certain area. The commanders were expected to keep Washington informed of major changes in the situation – verbally via a staff member, if they were in the heat of battle. As a historian I’m happy that many such orders survive; but I can’t help being amazed that battles were fought and won under those conditions.

So: Lafayette was given command of the advance force. Then General Lee changed his mind, apparently for social rather than military reasons (6/25/1778):

Dr General

When I first assented to the Marquis of Fayette’s taking the command of the present detachment, I confess I viewd it in a very different light than I do at present I considerd it as a more proper busyness of a Young Volunteering General than of the Second in command in the Army—but I find that it is considerd in a different manner; They say that a Corps consisting of six thoushand Men, the greater part chosen, is undoubtedly the most honourable command next to the Commander in Chief, that my ceding it woud of course have an odd appearance I must intreat therefore, (after making a thoushand apologies for the trouble my rash assent has occasion’d to you) that if this detachment does march that I may have the command of it—so far personally, but to speak as an Officer—I do not think that this detachment ought to march at all, untill at least the head of the Enemy’s right column has pass’d Cranbury—then if it is necessary to march the whole Army, I cannot see any impropriety in the Marquis’s commanding this detachment or a greater as advance Guard of the Army—but if this detachment with Maxwells Corps Scotts, Morgans and Jacksons are to be considerd as a seperate chosen active Corps and put under the Marquis’s Command until the Enemy leave the Jerseys—both Myself and Lord Steuben will be disgrac’d. I am, Dr General Yours  (Whole letter here)

Washington replied (6/26/1778), “Your uneasiness, on account of the command of yesterday’s detachment, fills me with concern, as it is not in my power, fully, to remove it without wounding the feelings of the Marquiss de la Fayette—I have thought of an expedient, which though not quite equal to either of your views, may in some measure answer both …” Lee was given command of the entire advance force, with Lafayette serving under him. (Whole letter here.)

Lafayette, in the field and eager to go, wrote to Washington later in the day. His spelling is, as always, charmingly erratic.

I would be very happy if we could attak them before they halt for I have no notion of taking one other moment but this off the march—if I Can not overtake them we could lay at some distance and attak to morrow Morning provided they do’nt escape in the night which I much fear as our intelligences are not the best ones; I have sent Some partys out and I will get some more light by them.

I fancy your excellency will move down with the army, and if we are at a Convenient distance from you I have nothing to fear in striking a blow if opportunity is offered, I believe that in our present strength provided they do’nt escape we may do Some thing. …

Sir, I want to repeat you in writing what I have told to you, which is that if you believe it, or if it is believed necessary or useful to the good of the Service and the honor of General lee to Send him down with a couple of thousand men or any force more, I will chearfully obey and Serve him not only out of duty but out of what I owe to that gentleman’s character … (Whole letter here)

The next day, June 27, 1778, Lee reported to Washington that he had taken up position near Englishtown (letter here).

Grunt’s-eye view of the Battle of Monmouth

Joseph Plumb Martin, a private in the Continental Army, had a remarkable knack of being present at crucial battles in the Revolutionary War. On June 28, 1778, he was with the army as it approached the British rearguard. Here’s the battle from a grunt’s-eye view:

It  was ten or eleven o’clock before we got through … and came into the open fields. The first cleared land we came to was an Indian cornfield, surrounded on the east, west and north sides by thick tall trees. The sun shining full upon the field, the soil of which was sandy, the mouth of a heated oven seemed to me to be but a trifle hotter than this ploughed field; it was almost impossible to breathe. We had to fall back again as soon as we could, into the woods. By the time we had got under the shade of the trees and had taken breath, of which we had been almost deprived, we received orders to retreat, as all the left wing of the army, that part being under the command of General Lee, were retreating. Grating as this order was to our feelings, we were obliged to comply.

We had not retreated far before we came to a defile, a muddy, sloughy brook. While the artillery were passing this place, we sat down by the roadside. In a few minutes the Commander in Chief and suite crossed the road just where we were sitting. I heard him ask our officers “by whose order the troops were retreating,” and being answered, “by General Lee’s,” he said something, but as he was moving forward all the time this was passing, he was too far off for me to hear it distinctly. Those that were nearer to him said that his words were “d——n him.” Whether he did thus express himself or not I do not know. It was certainly very unlike him, but he seemed at the instant to be in a great passion; his looks if not his words seemed to indicate as much. After passing us, he rode on to the plain field and took an observation of the advancing enemy. He remained there some time upon his old English charger, while the shot from the British artillery were rending up the earth all around him. After he had taken a view of the enemy, he returned and ordered the two Connecticut brigades to make a stand at a fence, in order to keep the enemy in check while the artillery and other troops crossed the before-mentioned defile. … (More here)

Generals at war

Lee responded to Washington’s exasperated comments on the battlefield in a letter of June 30, 1778, that drips with sarcasm:

Sir

From the knowledge I have of your Excys character—I must conclude that nothing but the misinformation of some very stupid, or misrepresentation of some very wicked person coud have occasioned your making use of so very singular expressions as you did on my coming up to the ground where you had taken post—They implyed that I was guilty either of disobedience of orders, of want of conduct, or want of courage. Your Excellency will therefore infinitely oblige me by letting me know on which of these three articles you ground your charge—that I may prepare for my justification which I have the happiness to be confident I can do to the army, to the Congress, to America, and to the world in general. Your excellency must give me leave to observe that neither yourself nor those about your person, could from your situation be in the least judges of the merits or demerits of our measures—And to speak with a becoming pride, I can assert that to these manouvers the success of the day was entirely owing—I can boldly say, that had we remained on the first ground, or had we advanced, or had the retreat been conducted in a manner different from what it was, this whole army and the interests of America would have risked being sacrificed. I ever had (and hope ever shall have the greatest respect and veneration for General Washington) I think him endowed with many great and good qualities, but in this instance I must pronounce that he has been guilty of an act of cruel injustice towards a man who certainly has some pretensions to the regard of every servant of this country—And I think Sir, I have a right to demand some reparation for the injury committed—and unless I can obtain it, I must in justice to myself, when this campaign is closed, [(]which I believe will close the war) retire from a service at the head of which is placed a man capable of offering such injuries. But at the same time in justice to you I must repeat that I from my soul believe, that it was not a motion of your own breast, but instigaged by some of those dirty earwigs who will for ever insinuate themselves near persons in high office—for I really am convinced that when General Washington acts from himself no man in his army will have reason to complain of injustice or indecorum. I am, Sir, and hope I ever shall have reason to continue your most sincerely devoted humble servt

Charles Lee (Whole letter here)

Washington sent a succinct reply the same day (6/30/1778):

I received your letter (dated thro’ mistake the 1st of July) expressed as I conceive, in terms highly improper. I am not conscious of having made use of any very singular expressions at the time of my meeting you, as you intimate. What I recollect to have said, was dictated by duty and warranted by the occasion. As soon as circumstances will permit, you shall have an opportunity, either of justifying yourself to the army, to Congress, to America, and to the world in General; or of convincing them that you were guilty of a breach of orders and of misbehaviour before the enemy on the 28th Inst. in not attacking them as you had been directed and in making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat. I am Sir your most obt servt

Lee replied later in the day (6/30/1778) more briefly, and with even more polite venom:

[Y]ou cannot afford me greater pleasure than in giving me the opportunity of shewing to America the sufficiency of her respective servants—I trust that temporary power of office and the tinsel dignity attending it will not be able by all the mists they can raise to affuscate the bright rays of truth, in the mean time your Excellency can have no objection to my retiring from the army—I am Sir your most obt hble servt

Charles Lee (Whole letter here)

Washington replied even more briefly, later the same day (6/30/1778):

Sir

Your letter by Colo. Fitzgerald and also one of this date have been duly received.1 I have sent Colo. Scammel, the Adjutant General to put you in arrest, who will deliver you a copy of the charges on which you will be tryed. I am Sir Yr most obt servt

Go: Washington (online here)

General Lee’s court-martial ran from July 4 to August 12, 1778; we have a transcript, which is as close as you and I will ever get to hearing Hamilton, Laurens, and Lee talk. Excerpts next week.

Laurens: “A rapidity and indecision calculated to ruin us”

Soon after the Battle of Monmouth, John Laurens and Alexander Hamilton wrote accounts of it. Laurens wrote (6/30/1778) to his father Henry, president of the Continental Congress, probably in the expectation that the letter’s contents would be shared with the Congress. Read the description very carefully until your eyes glaze over with the sheer confusion of it, and then  you’ll have some sense of what it must have been like on the battlefield that scorching June day. Then you can skim the rest of the battlefield details and just focus on the interaction between Laurens and Lee.

I was exceedingly chagrined that public business prevented my writing to you from the Field of battle, when the General sent his dispatches to Congress—the delay however will be attended with this advantage that I shall be better able to give you an account of the enemys loss—tho I must even now content myself with a very succinct relation of this affair—the situation of the two Armies on Sunday was as follows—Genl Washington with the main body of our army was at 4 miles distance from Englishtown—Genl Lee with a chosen advanced Corps was at that Town—the Enemy were retreating down the Road which leads to Middle Town …

I was with a small party of horse reconnoitring the enemy in an open space before Monmouth when I perceived two parties of the enemy advancing by files in the woods on our right and left, with a View as I imagined of enveloping our small party, or preparing the way for a skirmish of their horse—I immediately wrote an account of what I had seen to the General—and expressed my anxiety on account of the languid appearance of the continental troops under Gen Lee—some person in the mean time reported to Genl Lee that the Enemy were advancing upon us in two Columns—and I was informed that he had in consequence ordered Varnums brigade which was in front to repass a bridge which it had passed—I went myself & assured him of the real state of the case—his reply to me was, that his accounts had been so contradictory, that he was utterly at a loss what part to take—I repeated my account to him in positive distinct terms and returned to make farther discoveries—I found that the two parties had been withdrawn from the woods and that the enemy were preparing to leave Monmouth—I wrote a second time to Genl Washington—Genl Lee at length gave orders to advance—the Enemy were forming themselves on the Middletown Road, with their light infantry in front, and Cavalry on the left flank—while a scattering distant fire was commenced between our flanking parties and theirs—I was impatient, and uneasy at seeing that no disposition was made, and endeavored to find out Genl Lee to inform him of what was doing, and know what was his disposition—he told me that he was going to order some troops to march below the Enemy and cut off their retreat—two Pieces of Artillery were posted on our right without a single foot soldier to support them—our men were formed piecemeal in front of the Enemy—and there appeared to be no general plan or disposition—calculated on that of the Enemy, the nature of the ground, or any of the other principles which generally govern in these cases—the Enemy began a cannonade from two parts of their line—their whole body of horse made a furious charge upon a small party of our Cavalry and dissipated them, and drove them till the appearance of our infantry and a judicious discharge or two of Artillery made them retire precipitately—three Regiments of ours that had advanced in a plain open country towards the enemys left flank, were ordered by Gen Lee to retire and occupy the village of Monmouth they were no sooner formed there, than they were ordered to quit that post and gain the woods—one order succeeded another, with a rapidity and indecision calculated to ruin us—the enemy had changed their front and were advancing in full march toward us—our men were fatigued, with the excessive heat—the artillery horses were not in condition to make a brisk retreat—a new position was ordered—but not generally communicated—for part of the Troops were forming on the right of the ground, while others were marching away, and all the Artillery driving off—the enemy after a short halt resumed their pursuit—no Cannon was left to check their progress—a Regiment was ordered to form behind a fence and as speedily commanded to retire—all this disgraceful retreating—passed without the firing of a Musket—over ground which might have been disputed Inch by Inch—we passed a defile—and arrived at an eminence beyond which was defended on one hand by an impracticable fen—on the other by thick woods where our men must have fought to advantage—here fortunately for the honor of the Army, and the welfare of America—Genl. Washington met the troops retreating—in disorder, and without any plan to make an opposition—he ordered some pieces of Artillery to be brought up to defend the pass—and some troops to form and protect the pieces—the Artillery was too distant to be brought up readily so that there was but little opposition given here—a few shot though and a little skirmishing in the wood checked the Enemys career—The Genl expressed his astonishment at this unaccountable Retreat, Mr Lee indecently replied that the attack was contrary to his advice and opinion in council—we were obliged to retire to a position which though hastily reconnoitred, proved an excellent one—two Regiments were formed behind a fence in front of the position—the enemys horse advanced in full charge with admirable bravery—to the distance of forty paces—when a general discharge from these two Regiments—did great execution among them, and made them fly with the greatest precipitation—the Grenadiers succeeded to the attack—in this spot the action was hottest, and there was considerable Slaughter of British Grenadiers—The General ordered Woodfords brigade with some Artillery to take possession of an eminence on the enemys left and cannonade from thence—this produced an excellent effect—the enemy were prevented from advancing on us—and confined themselves to cannonade with a shew of turning our left flank—our artillery answered theirs—with the greatest vigour—the general seeing that our left flank was secure—as the ground was open and commanded by it—so that the enemy could not attempt to turn us without exposing their own flank to a heavy fire from our artillery, and causing to pass in review before us, the force employed for turning us—in the mean time Genl Lee continued retreating—Baron Steuben was order’d to form the broken troops in the rear—The Cannonade was incessant, and the General ordered parties to advance from time to time, and engage the British Grenadiers—and Guards—the horse shewed themselves no more—the Grenadiers shewed their backs and retreated every where with precipitation—they returned however again to the charge and were again repulsed—they finally retreated and got over the strong pass where as I mentioned before Genl Washington first rallied the troops—we advanced in force and continued Masters of the ground—the Standards of Liberty were planted in Triumph on the field of battle—we remained looking at each other with the defile between us till dark—& they stole off in silence at midnight— (Whole letter here)

Hamilton: “Success so far inferior to what we in all probability should have had”

Alexander Hamilton, who was also carrying messages to and from Washington, described the battle to Elias Boudinot a week later (7/5/1778). Boudinot (1740-1821) was a friend from Hamilton’s days in Elizabethtown, and at this time a delegate from New Jersey to the Continental Congress.

My dear Sir,

You will by this time imagine that I have forgotten my promise of writing to you, as I have been so long silent on an occasion, which most people will be fond of celebrating to their friends. The truth is, I have no passion for scribbling [REALLY, Alex?!] and I know you will be at no loss for the fullest information. But that you may not have a right to accuse me of negligence, I will impose upon myself the drugery of saying something about the transactions of the 28th, in which the American arms gained very signal advantages; and might have gained much more signal ones.

Indeed, I can hardly persuade myself to be in good humour with success so far inferior to what we, in all probability should have had, had not the finest opportunity America ever possessed been fooled away by a man, in whom she has placed a large share of the most ill judged confidence. You will have heard enough to know, that I mean General Lee. This man is either a driveler in the business of soldiership or something much worse. To let you fully into the silly and pitiful game he has been playing, I will take the tale up from the beginning; expecting you will consider what I say, as in the most perfect confidence.

When we came to Hopewell Township, The General unluckily called a council of war, the result of which would have done honor to the most honorab[le] society of midwives, and to them only. The purport was, that we should keep at a comfortable distance from the enemy, and keep up a vain parade of annoying them by detachment. In persuance of this idea, a detachment of 1500 men was sent off under General Scot to join the other troops near the enemy’s lines. General Lee was primum mobile of this sage plan; and was even opposed to sending so considerable a force. The General, on mature reconsideration of what had been resolved on, determined to persue a different line of conduct at all hazards. With this view; he marched the army the next morning towards Kingston and there made another detachment of 1000 men under General Wayne; and formed all the detached troops into an advanced corps under the command of the Marquis De la fayette. The project was, that this advanced corps should take the first opportunity to attack the enemy’s rear on the march, to be supported or covered as circumstances should require by the whole army.

General Lee’s conduct with respect to the command of this corps was truly childish. According to the incorrect notions of our army his seniority would have intitled him to the command of the advanced corps; but he in the first instance declined it, in favour of the Marquis. Some of his friends having blamed him for doing it, and Lord Stirling having shown a disposition to interpose his claim, General Lee very inconsistently reasserted his pretensions. The matter was a second time accommodated; General Lee and Lord Stirling agreed to let the Marquis command. General Lee a little time after, recanted again and became very importunate. The General, who had all along observed the greatest candor in the matter, grew tired of such fickle behaviour and ordered the Marquis to proceed.

The enemy in marching from Allen Town had changed their disposition and thrown all their best troops in the rear; this made it necessary, to strike a stroke with propriety, to reinforce the advanced corps. Two brigades were detached for this purpose, and the General, willing to accommodate General Lee, sent him with them to take the command of the whole advanced corps, which rendezvoused the forenoon of the 27th at English Town, consisting of at least 5000 rank & file, most of them select troops. General Lee’s orders were, the moment he received intelligence of the enemy’s march to persue them & to attack their rear.

This intelligence was received about five oClock the morning of the 28th. and General Lee put his troops in motion accordingly. The main body did the same. The advanced corps came up with the enemys rear a mile or two beyond the court House; I saw the enemy drawn up, and am persuaded there were not a thousand men; their front from different accounts was then ten miles off. However favourable this situation may seem for an attack it was not made; but after changing their position two or three times by retrograde movements our advanced corps got into a general confused retreat and even route would hardly be too strong an expression. Not a word of all this was officially communicated to the General; as we approached the supposed place of action we heard some flying rumours of what had happened in consequence of which the General rode forward and found the troops retiring in the greatest disorder and the enemy pressing upon their rear. I never saw the general to so much advantage. His coolness and firmness were admirable. He instantly took measures for checking the enemy’s advance, and giving time for the army, which was very near, to form and make a proper disposition. He then rode back and had the troops formed on a very advantageous piece of ground; in which and in other transactions of the day General Greene & Lord Stirling rendered very essential service, and did themselves great honor. The sequel is, we beat the enemy and killed and wounded at least a thousand of their best troops. America owes a great deal to General Washington for this day’s work; a general route dismay and disgrace would have attended the whole army in any other hands but his. By his own good sense and fortitude he turned the fate of the day. Other officers have great merit in performing their parts well; but he directed the whole with the skill of a Master workman. He did not hug himself at a distance and leave an Arnold to win laurels for him [NOTE: a reference to Benedict Arnold’s valor at Saratoga, when fighting under General Horatio Gates]; but by his own presence, he brought order out of confusion, animated his troops and led them to success.

A great number of our officers distinguished themselves this day. …  In short one can hardly name particulars without doing injustice to the rest. The behaviour of the officers and men in general was such as could not easily be surpassed. Our troops, after the first impulse from mismanagement, behaved with more spirit & moved with greater order than the British troops. You know my way of thinking about our army, and that I am not apt to flatter it. I assure you I never was pleased with them before this day.

What part our family acted let others say. I hope you will not suspec[t] me of vanity when I tell you that one of them Fitsgerald, had a slight contusion with a Musket ball, another, Laurens, had a slight contusion also—and his horse killed—a third, Hamilton, had his horse wounded in the first part of the action with a musket ball. If the rest escaped, it is only to be ascribed to better fortune, not more prudence in keeping out of the way. …

What think you now of General Lee? You will be ready to join me in condemning him: And yet, I fear a Court Martial will not do it. A certain preconceived and preposterous opinion of his being a very great man will operate much in his favour. Some people are very industrious in making interest for him. Whatever a court Martial may decide, I shall continue to believe and say—his conduct was monstrous and unpardonable. … (Whole letter here)

More

• The Battle of Monmouth gave rise to the story of Molly Pitcher, whom most of us know only as the name of a rest stop on the New Jersey Turnpike.
• Joseph Plumb Martin’s account of the Revolutionary War is here.
• I’ve occasionally added comments based on these blog posts to the Genius.com pages on the Hamilton Musical. Follow me @DianneDurante.
• The usual disclaimer: This is the twenty-third in a series of posts on Hamilton: An American Musical.  Other posts are available via the tag cloud at lower right. The ongoing “index” to these posts is my Kindle book, Alexander Hamilton: A Brief Biography. Bottom line: these are unofficial musings, and you do not need them to enjoy the musical or the soundtrack.
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